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F or over 40 years, the benchmark economic model of tax evasion has been the Allingham and Sandmo (1972) model, in which self-interested taxpayers choose how much income to report to the tax authority by trading off the 
benefits of evasion (lower tax payments) against the costs of evasion (the possibility 
of being caught and punished). In this model, the key policy parameters affecting 
tax evasion are the tax rate, the detection probability, and the penalty imposed 
conditional on the evasion being detected.
However, there is an apparent disconnect between much of the academic 
literature on tax compliance and the administration of tax policy. While tax admin-
istrators are obviously concerned about enforcement, they also tend to place a 
great deal of emphasis on improving “tax morale,” by which they generally mean 
increasing voluntary compliance with tax laws and creating a social norm of compli-
ance. The OECD (2001), for example, noted that “[t]he promotion of voluntary 
compliance should be a primary concern of revenue authorities” in its principles for 
good tax administration, and it has highlighted the importance of tax morale more 
generally (OECD 2013).
Tax authorities around the world pursue policies that reflect their belief that 
nonpecuniary factors are important in tax compliance decisions. More than half of 
US states have or have had “name and shame” programs in which the names of top 
tax debtors are revealed publicly on state websites. In a more colorful example, the 
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city of Patna in Bihar, India, deployed “singing eunuchs” to shame shopkeepers into 
paying their taxes (BBC News 2006).1 An alternative to shaming tax evaders is to recog-
nize compliant or high-paying taxpayers publicly, a strategy adopted by an increasing 
number of developing countries. Some nations have instituted public campaigns to 
change attitudes towards tax evasion. For example, recent television and print adver-
tising campaigns in Italy have highlighted the need to reduce widespread tax evasion 
in order to better cope with the European debt crisis (Povoledo 2011).
The term “tax morale” is often used in reference to these types of influences on tax 
compliance. We will define tax morale broadly as an umbrella term capturing nonpe-
cuniary motivations for tax compliance as well as factors that fall outside the standard, 
expected utility framework. For example, individuals may have some intrinsic motiva-
tion to pay taxes or feel guilt or shame for failure to comply. They may comply due 
to reciprocal motivations: the willingness to pay taxes in exchange for benefits that 
the state provides to them or to others even though their pecuniary payoff would 
be higher if they didn’t pay taxes. Individuals may be influenced by peer behavior 
and the possibility of social recognition or sanctions from peers. Cultural or social 
norms can affect the strength of these intrinsic motivations, reciprocal motivations, or 
the sensitivity to peers. We will also include deviations from standard expected utility 
maximization, such as loss aversion, in our definition of tax morale.
Michael Waweru (2004), then the head of Kenya’s revenue authority, captured 
many of the tax morale channels we have in mind during a presentation to the 
President of Kenya. Waweru said:
KRA [Kenya Revenue Authority] has organised a Taxpayers’ week from 18th 
to 23rd October throughout the country. The period was carefully chosen to 
coincide with Kenyatta Day celebrations in honour of our national heroes. 
The running theme throughout the celebrations will be “Kulipa Ushuru ni 
kulinda Uhuru” or “Pay your Taxes and set your country free” as a way of 
paying glowing tribute to those who dedicated their lives to free our beloved 
country from the humiliation of colonialism. Present taxpayers are taking a 
leading role in freeing their country from donor dependency to economic 
independence. The climax of these celebrations will be on 21st October 2004, 
when we will be recognizing Distinguished Taxpayers.
The linkage of tax compliance with honoring national heroes is clearly meant 
to prompt intrinsically motivated compliance, and the reference to compliance 
reducing donor dependence highlights the notion that tax payments have a direct 
benefit for society. The potential importance of peer effects and social norms is 
illustrated through the decision to recognize “Distinguished Taxpayers” and the 
adoption of a slogan that seems designed to change the overall social attitude toward 
tax compliance. Notice that some of these policies may confer private pecuniary 
1 The article uses the term “eunuch” for the community in South Asia referred to as “hijras,” who are not 
necessarily eunuchs in the technical sense.
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rewards. For example, public recognition could improve firms’ reputations and 
therefore revenues. Isolating the components of behavior that are attributable to 
tax morale is therefore an empirical challenge.
We argue that tax morale is indeed an important component of tax compliance 
decisions, though we view enforcement as the primary driver of compliance. We 
then demonstrate that tax morale operates through a variety of underlying mecha-
nisms, drawing on evidence from laboratory studies, natural experiments, and an 
emerging literature employing randomized field experiments. We do not attempt 
to provide a comprehensive review of the literature. Rather, we highlight a few 
studies that illustrate specific channels through which tax morale can affect compli-
ance behavior. Finally, we consider the implications for tax policy and attempt to 
understand why recent interventions designed to improve morale, and thereby 
compliance, have had mixed results to date.
How Important is Tax Morale?
The standard Allingham and Sandmo model (1972) is a straightforward appli-
cation of the Becker (1968) model of crime to the tax-evasion context: risk-averse 
individuals weigh the utility benefits and costs of evasion to optimize their compli-
ance behavior. The model yields intuitive comparative statics—for example, that a 
larger penalty or a greater probability of detection should lead to a reduction in 
tax evasion. However, Allingham and Sandmo were also the first to recognize that 
their model does not capture all motivations for tax compliance, writing: “This is a 
very simple theory, and it may perhaps be criticized for giving too little attention to 
nonpecuniary factors in the taxpayer’s decision on whether or not to evade taxes.” 
Again, we use the term “tax morale” as a shorthand for any such nonpecuniary 
factors as well as deviations from expected utility maximization.
A natural question is how important tax morale is for compliance: Is it a major 
determinant of compliance or does it only have a trivial impact? A first sense of the 
importance of tax morale comes from surveys that directly ask individuals about 
attitudes towards tax evasion. For example, the World Values Survey asks respon-
dents to rate the justifiability of “cheating on taxes if you have a chance.” Over 
60  percent of respondents worldwide answer that cheating is never justifiable, 
and over 80 percent give a response of 8 or higher on a 10-point scale where 10 
denotes that cheating is never justifiable.2 Similarly, over 80 percent of respondents 
to the 2004 wave of the European Social Survey “agreed” or “strongly agreed” with 
the statement that “citizens should not cheat on their taxes.” These survey ques-
tions indicate a strong overall view that tax evasion is wrong, suggesting that the 
Allingham and Sandmo (1972) model does not capture the full range of factors 
relevant for compliance.
2 Calculated from the 2005–2007 wave of the World Values Survey using data from 53 countries. Data 
from Ghana and Serbia were omitted due to data quality issues.
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We would of course want to know whether these self-reported attitudes translate 
into actual compliance behavior. Some studies have attempted to measure evasion 
at the country level and relate this to survey measures of tax morale. However, 
constructing valid proxies of tax evasion across countries is very challenging. In 
addition, relating constructed proxies for tax evasion to tax morale (or other predic-
tive variables) typically requires strong assumptions about how to measure untaxed 
economic activity, assumptions which are unlikely to hold in practice (for a detailed 
discussion, see Slemrod and Weber 2012).3
A second way to assess the importance of tax morale is indirectly, by attempting 
to determine the degree of compliance that would be predicted given the charac-
teristics of the enforcement environment. Additional residual compliance is then 
attributed to tax morale. The Allingham and Sandmo (1972) model of tax evasion 
does not take into account that audit rates could be conditional on discrepancies 
between self-reported income and reports from third parties, such as employers 
(Kleven, Knudsen, Kreiner, Pedersen, and Saez 2011). For example, individuals in 
the United States are unlikely to evade on income that employers are required to 
report to the IRS using a W-2 form because they know that such evasion will be 
detected with near certainty. This situation can lead to low observed tax evasion, 
as well as low audit and penalty rates in equilibrium. Hence, inferring tax morale as 
residual compliance in the Allingham and Sandmo (1972) model is credible only in 
settings without third-party reporting.
Even on forms of income not subject to third-party reporting, compliance 
often appears higher than would be predicted under observed audit rates, realistic 
penalties, and plausible levels of risk aversion. Alm, McClelland, and Schulze (1992) 
calibrate the Allingham and Sandmo model for reasonable parameter values for the 
United States. They find that a mid-range estimate of the coefficient of relative risk 
aversion (γ = 3) implies compliance of 13 percent, well below audit-based estimates 
of compliance for most forms of business income (where third-party reporting is 
limited) in the United States. For example, compliance on nonfarm proprietor 
income in 2001 was 43 percent (Slemrod 2007). A recent audit study in Denmark 
was able to distinguish third-party and self-reported income at the line-item level 
(Kleven et  al. 2011). The study found even higher compliance (in the range of 
80–95 percent) for most sources of self-reported income. To put this in context, the 
Alm, McClelland, and Schulze (1992) calibrations require the coefficient of relative 
3 Perhaps the most commonly used proxies of tax evasion are measures of the shadow economy 
constructed using a MIMIC (Multiple Indicators Multiple Causes) approach (for example, Schneider 
2005, and subsequent measures derived from it). The resulting shadow economy measure is a weighted 
sum of predictors such as per capita GDP, indicators of fiscal burden, quality of institutions, and some-
times even tax morale itself. While this measure can be informative about variation across countries 
and over time, regressing the shadow economy measure on a predictor such as tax morale leads to a 
mechanical relationship if tax morale was used to construct the shadow economy variable. Even if tax 
morale isn’t used to construct the shadow economy measure, this regression ultimately uncovers a corre-
lation between one predictor of the shadow economy (tax morale) and other predictors of the shadow 
economy (that is, a weighted average of predictors such as GDP, fiscal burden and quality of institutions).
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risk aversion to be quite high (γ = 5) to achieve 44 percent compliance and extraor-
dinarily high (γ = 10) to achieve 71 percent compliance.4
There are at least three caveats to these calibration exercises. First, audit studies 
reveal detected evasion, which is likely to be a lower bound on true evasion. Second, 
underreporting income or overreporting deductions is likely to invite scrutiny by the 
tax authorities, even absent third-party reporting, so that audit rates are not random 
but rather a function of misreporting. Finally, some residual compliance could be 
driven by private pecuniary benefits from compliance, such as improved access to 
credit or productivity gains from not needing to keep double books. Nevertheless, 
these calibration exercises do suggest a nontrivial role for nonpecuniary factors in 
encouraging tax compliance.
A third avenue for learning about the importance of tax morale is to examine 
compliance behavior in environments where tax enforcement is limited or nonexis-
tent and private pecuniary benefits of compliance are likely to be minimal. Dwenger, 
Kleven, Rasul, and Rincke (2014), focus on such an environment in studying compli-
ance with the local Protestant church tax in a metropolitan area in Bavaria. When 
collecting the local church tax, the Protestant church makes clear that this tax 
is legally obligated as specified by the German tax code. However, this tax is not 
enforced and knowledge of the lack of enforcement appears widespread: a treatment 
in which the collection letter explicitly stated that collection would not be enforced 
had no statistically or economically significant effect on compliance. Despite the lack 
of enforcement, about 20 percent of individuals pay at least as much tax as is owed, 
indicating an important role for tax-morale-driven compliance in this setting.
Whether this finding generalizes is unclear for at least two  reasons (which 
work in opposite directions). First, the use of funds from the local church tax is 
associated with a particular type of service, which individuals may value more than 
the services funded by other types of taxes. Second, the fact that there was zero 
enforcement, despite the fact that the tax is easily enforceable, is unusual. It could 
signal to individuals that, while the church tax is technically a legal obligation, the 
church/government does not actually consider it an important civic obligation. 
This in turn could undermine tax morale.
A fourth way to shed light on the importance of tax morale on compliance is 
to examine compliance behavior of taxpayers that measurably differ in tax morale 
but all face the same enforcement environment. DeBacker, Heim, and Tran (2012) 
relate corporate tax evasion of foreign-held corporations in the United States to 
corruption levels in the owners’ countries of origin. Given that the enforcement 
environment is common, the corruption levels in the countries of origin can affect 
compliance only through a tax morale channel. An important strength of this study 
is that it uses data from over 25,000 IRS corporate tax audits; it is rare that a study’s 
4 To illustrate the degree of risk aversion an individual exhibits at γ = 5 and γ = 10, consider whether 
an individual is willing to take a gamble that offers a 50 percent chance of doubling one’s income and a 
50 percent chance of losing X percent of income. The individual with γ = 5 finds this gamble too risky to 
accept if X ≥ 16 percent whereas an individual with γ = 10 declines this gamble whenever X ≥ 8 percent. 
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information on tax evasion is available at the taxpayer level and is derived from 
actual audit data. DeBacker, Heim, and Tran (2012) find that corporations with 
owners from more corrupt countries evade more US tax. This effect is both statis-
tically significant and economically sizable: an average-sized firm with an owner 
from a country with the level of corruption of Nigeria has an evasion level that 
is 8 percent of the tax obligation higher than a similar firm with an owner from 
a country with the level of corruption of Sweden. The authors control for firm 
characteristics and a number of other source-country characteristics (such as per 
capita GDP), which reduces the scope for omitted variable bias to drive their results. 
Given that corruption in the country of origin does not capture all aspects of the 
owner’s tax morale (that is, owners from the same country may have different tax 
morale), the estimated magnitude of tax morale is likely to be a lower bound of the 
total effect of tax morale. Hence, this study suggests a sizable role for tax morale in 
compliance decisions.
Our reading of these four  sources of evidence taken together is that tax 
morale plays a meaningful role in tax compliance behavior, at least in the 
developed-country settings on which this evidence was largely based. It would be 
useful to quantify the importance of tax morale relative to the importance of tax 
enforcement, but implementing such a decomposition faces both conceptual and 
practical challenges. Conceptually, the importance of tax morale depends on the 
enforcement environment because tax morale and enforcement generally interact. 
At one extreme, if enforcement is so draconian that compliance is perfect, there 
is no role for tax morale. At the other extreme of no enforcement whatsoever, tax 
morale may be eroded because the lack of enforcement efforts signals that compli-
ance is unimportant.
One practical challenge is that—even in the absence of enforcement inter-
actions—we would expect the relative importance of tax morale to vary across 
countries and even across types of taxes within a country. Even in the rare cases in 
which we are able to measure the role of tax morale (for example, in the German 
church tax case), resulting estimates are unlikely to generalize. A further chal-
lenge when attempting to decompose cross-country variation in compliance is that 
we measure tax morale on a scale that does not have a well-defined zero. In the 
DeBacker, Heim, and Tran (2012) study of US corporate tax evasion mentioned 
above, for example, we can compare compliance at different observed levels of tax 
morale, but cannot assess what compliance would have been if tax morale were 
zero. While we cannot quantify the relative importance of enforcement and tax 
morale, our view is that enforcement is the primary driver of tax compliance but 
that tax morale meaningfully enhances compliance.
It is important to note that what matters for policy is not so much what role tax 
morale plays in current compliance, but whether it is feasible to improve tax morale 
on the margin and whether a given increase in compliance can be achieved at a 
lower cost by improving tax morale than by increasing enforcement. Before consid-
ering which policies could affect tax morale, it is therefore important to understand 
the mechanisms through which tax morale may operate.
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Tax Morale Mechanisms
While tax morale is commonly used as a single concept, it can be more accu-
rately thought of as a set of underlying motivations for tax compliance. Identifying 
the channels through which tax morale operates is both important for under-
standing individual preferences and for designing appropriate policy responses. 
We consider five broadly defined potential mechanisms through which tax morale 
could operate, recognizing that these channels are not mutually exclusive and are 
in fact likely to overlap and interact with each other. 
The five classes of mechanisms are: 1) intrinsic motivation, which can be viewed 
as an additional term in the utility function that increases in the amount of taxes 
that the individual decides to pay (with, possibly, a discontinuous upward jump 
for paying the required amount); 2) reciprocity, in which an additional utility term for 
paying taxes depends in some way on the individual’s relationship to the state 
(for example, on public goods provided by the state or perceptions about the fair-
ness of the tax system); 3) peer effects and social influences, in which the additional 
utility term for paying taxes depends on views or behaviors of other individuals; 
4) long-run cultural factors that may affect the willingness to pay taxes; and 5) infor-
mation imperfections and deviations from utility maximization (for example, individuals 
may misperceive the probability of being detected in evading taxes or may exhibit 
loss aversion).
Forms of Intrinsic Motivation
When considering how tax morale might influence taxpayer decisions, one 
possibility is forms of intrinsic motivation that may induce people to comply with 
laws and expectations. Other forms of intrinsic motivation are feelings of pride and 
positive self-image that are often associated with honesty and the fulfillment of civic 
duties, and altruism toward others, which could result in a willingness to contribute 
to public goods through the tax system. Cheating on taxes may cause feelings of 
guilt or shame (Andreoni, Erard, and Feinstein 1998).
Direct evidence on the role of intrinsic motivations comes from Dwenger, 
Kleven, Rasul, and Rincke (2014). As discussed above, this study documents some 
degree of compliance with the local German Protestant church tax, even in an envi-
ronment in which both actual and perceived enforcement is nonexistent. While 
this overall compliance effect could be driven by several underlying components 
of tax morale, we see sharp bunching at the exact level of owed tax. One interpre-
tation of this bunching (if individuals are truly unconcerned about enforcement) 
is that it reflects one specific form of intrinsic motivation: a desire to comply with 
the law.
Indirect evidence on the role of intrinsic motivations comes from field experi-
ments that have attempted to prime intrinsic motivations. These interventions take 
the form of “moral suasion” letters to taxpayers that include text emphasizing various 
elements of tax morale. The effects of these letters are generally compared to some 
type of baseline letter to address the possibility that receiving a letter related to taxes 
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might directly affect compliance by signaling a change in the enforcement regime. 
If we observe treatment effects in response to such letters, this indicates that the 
particular underlying channel of tax morale that was primed is operating. However, 
it is important to stress that a lack of treatment effects does not necessarily imply 
that the underlying channel does not influence compliance: it may exist, but be 
inelastic to the particular intervention.
Indeed, many field interventions that have attempted to prime tax morale have 
failed to find effects on compliance. An example of an intervention approximating 
pure moral suasion is an experiment conducted by Fellner, Sausgruber, and Traxler 
(2013), who examine evasion of TV and radio licensing fees in Austria. One of the 
treatment arms added the following language to a baseline letter: “Those who do 
not conscientiously register their broadcasting receivers not only violate the law, but 
also harm all honest households. Hence, registering is also a matter of fairness.” 
The study found that this moral suasion letter did not improve compliance relative 
to the baseline letter. Other studies using this methodology include information 
about how tax revenues are used or about the compliance of others. Since these 
interventions seek to trigger motives like reciprocity or peer effects, we will discuss 
them in the subsections below.
If tax payments are partially intrinsically motivated, then the extrinsic incen-
tives of tax enforcement could potentially crowd out intrinsic motivation. This 
possibility is predicted by theoretical models in which external incentives crowd out 
prosocial behavior (for example, Bénabou and Tirole 2006). It is also consistent 
with the authors’ own conversations with tax officials in developing countries, in 
which the officials repeatedly expressed the view that heavy-handed tax enforce-
ment could backfire by reducing “voluntary” compliance. But at least in the context 
of local German church taxes—where we see clear evidence of intrinsically moti-
vated payment—enforcement interventions have indicated that this type of crowd 
out appears limited. Dwenger, Kleven, Rasul, and Rincke (2014) show that inter-
ventions with audit threats increase compliance of those who evaded in the prior 
year but do not have a significant effect on payments by those initially paying at 
or above the owed amount. Boyer, Dwenger, and Rincke (2014) conduct a related 
randomized evaluation, in a setting similar to Dwenger et al. (2014), but focusing 
on the local Catholic church tax rather than the local Protestant church tax. Letters 
emphasizing that the church tax is a compulsory payment rather than a donation 
appear to result in some crowd out for individuals who donated infrequently in 
previous years, but have a small and insignificant effect on those who consistently 
donated in the past.
While we do not wish to generalize too far from this specific context, the church 
tax findings overall do suggest that enforcement does not erode intrinsic motiva-
tion. It thus can be a useful tool for compliance including in settings where some 
individuals are intrinsically motivated. In theory, enforcement could even amplify 
intrinsic motivation by signaling that tax compliance is an important legal or civic 
duty, although field interventions to date have not been designed in a way that 
would allow us to test for such effects.
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Reciprocity
We use the term reciprocity broadly for situations in which willingness to pay 
taxes depends on the individual’s relationship with the state other than direct 
tax–benefit linkages (where a tax payment directly causes benefits to the individual 
to increase). Individuals may view taxes as part of a social contract: tax payments 
are made in exchange for services provided by the state. This view of tax compli-
ance suggests that compliance may be affected by perceptions of the legitimacy 
of the state (Levi 1989) as well as by attitudes toward government or perceptions 
about the fairness of the tax schedule (for example, Feld and Frey 2002; Hofmann, 
Hoelzl, and Kirchler 2008). Compliance may also be affected by the types of 
government services that are funded by tax revenues and how these are viewed by 
the taxpayer.5
A number of studies have documented positive correlations between survey 
measures of institutional quality, trust in government, and satisfaction with public 
services and survey measures of tax morale (for a review, see OECD 2013), as well 
as relationships between institutions and tax morale (for example, Torgler 2005). 
However, specific causal channels can be difficult to isolate. Some studies have 
manipulated these elements in a laboratory setting using student subjects, with 
parameters approximating the US income tax system, and have found that partici-
pants are less likely to evade taxes when funds are given to an organization that they 
support and when they feel active in the decision-making process (for example, 
Alm, Jackson, and McKee 1993).
Changing the decision-making process or actual use of tax revenues is obviously 
much more challenging outside the laboratory setting. Existing randomized field 
studies have therefore attempted to prime reciprocal motivations by highlighting 
the beneficial uses of tax revenues. One early study included a treatment arm that 
described the types of social programs on which tax revenues in Minnesota are 
spent, noting that “when taxpayers do not pay what they owe, the entire commu-
nity suffers” (Blumenthal, Christian, and Slemrod 2001). Dwenger et  al. (2014) 
included a treatment arm emphasizing that local German church tax revenues fund 
work in the parish, and Castro and Scartascini (2013) gave taxpayers in Argentina 
information about specific public goods in their community that had recently been 
provided by the local government. None of these studies found significant effects 
of these treatments on tax compliance. Together with the Fellner, Sausgruber, 
and Traxler (2013) findings, the literature to date thus suggests limited power 
of a variety of types of moral suasion. Ariel (2012) even finds suggestive evidence of 
moral suasion letters backfiring in a field experiment on value-added tax compli-
ance by small corporations in Israel.
5 One channel that we include with reciprocity is the possibility that the individual’s willingness to comply 
depends on the use of raised revenue. This channel could operate because the individual feels “pure” 
altruism towards the beneficiaries of government spending. Despite the fact that pure altruism is strictly 
speaking an intrinsic motivation, we discuss this channel in the current subsection because we cannot 
empirically distinguish it from reciprocal motivations.
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However, there are some counterexamples. Bott, Cappelen, Sørensen, and 
Tungodden (2014) examine compliance with foreign-income reporting require-
ments in a field experiment involving Norwegian taxpayers who had evaded taxes 
on foreign income in a prior year. They find positive effects when the results of 
their four moral suasion treatments are pooled. Three of these treatments high-
lighted the public goods on which tax revenues are spent while the fourth noted 
that the majority of taxpayers comply fully, so compliance is a matter of fairness. 
Hence, these treatments may have triggered other aspects of tax morale in addi-
tion to reciprocal motivations. Finally, Hallsworth, List, Metcalfe, and Vlaev (2014) 
examine a different margin of compliance, showing that late payment of taxes in 
the United Kingdom falls in response to reminder letters that emphasize the ways 
in which tax revenue finances public goods.
One possible interpretation for the predominance of null findings is that 
reciprocal motivations have little relevance for tax compliance decisions outside 
the laboratory. However, it is also possible—and in our view, likely—that such inter-
ventions are often not powerful enough to affect compliance. Individuals’ views of 
the competence of the government and the value of the public services it provides 
are formed through a lifetime of personal experience: a few lines of text in a mailed 
letter may just not be sufficient to cause taxpayers to update their beliefs or attitudes 
in many contexts.
Manipulating other potential reciprocal motivations, such as attitudes about the 
fairness of the tax system or trust in government, is difficult to do in the context of a 
laboratory or field experiment. Some direct evidence on perceptions of fairness and 
tax compliance comes from Besley, Jensen, and Persson (2014), who examine the 
poll tax imposed in the United Kingdom starting in 1989–1990 under the Thatcher 
government. The poll tax replaced a tax based on property values. A massive back-
lash against this tax forced its repeal only three years later and resulted in a return 
to a property-value-based tax (the “council tax”). The authors argue that the back-
lash reflected a widespread perception that the poll tax system was unfair because it 
was not related to ability to pay, and they document a sharp spike in evasion at the 
time the poll tax was introduced.
While the move to a poll tax is an extreme example, the findings do suggest 
that compliance decisions can be affected by government policy, conditional on a 
given enforcement environment. If tax payment is motivated—at least in part—by 
the benefits provided by taxation or perceptions of the legitimacy of the state, the 
possibility of multiple equilibria arises. Weak tax morale could lead to low compli-
ance, low revenue, and poor state capacity and provision of services, thereby further 
reducing tax morale.
Peer Effects and Social Influences
We now turn to ways in which an individual’s compliance could be directly 
affected by others. Individuals may wish to conform to the behavior of others, so 
that peer compliance directly affects the individual’s own compliance. Individuals 
may also wish to signal something about their type to their peers through their 
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compliance behavior. The value of this signal may depend on peer compliance: for 
example, paying taxes may only be a positive signal to others who are also compliant, 
or inference about type could depend on the number of compliant taxpayers. Finally, 
if individuals imperfectly perceive the enforcement environment, the behavior of 
peers may influence individuals’ own beliefs about the consequences of tax evasion.
One implication of these models is that a shock to individual compliance can 
be amplified through social influences. The Besley, Jensen, and Persson (2014) 
study of Britain’s poll tax presents a model that includes both reciprocity arising 
from perceptions of fairness of the tax schedule (defined as intrinsic motiva-
tion by the authors) as well as a social norm effect arising from a desire to signal 
prosocial motivations to others. As noted above, the temporary shift to a poll tax 
sharply increases evasion, arguably due to a reduction in reciprocity motivations. 
However, higher levels of evasion persist well after the poll tax is replaced with the 
property-value-based council tax, particularly in councils that had high evasion 
during the poll tax period, consistent with a social norm effect.
These findings raise the question of whether governments have the capacity to 
influence social norms for compliance in a positive way. As discussed in the intro-
duction, tax authorities around the world have undertaken policies with this goal 
in mind. A recent set of field experiments has begun to evaluate the causal impact 
of such interventions on compliance. A first channel through which governments 
could leverage social interactions is by providing information on peer behavior. 
However, field experiments in high-compliance contexts notifying taxpayers that 
over 90 percent of individuals comply have failed to find significant treatment effects 
(Blumenthal, Christian, and Slemrod 2001; Fellner, Sausgruber, and Traxler 2013). 
It is possible that these studies have not found treatment effects because indi-
viduals already had a clear sense of overall compliance. One study that examines 
this possibility is Del Carpio (2014). In a field experiment on property tax collection 
in Peru, she also collected perceptions of tax compliance and enforcement in the 
treatment and control groups after the interventions had been administered.6 She 
finds that an intervention combining information about peer compliance and a 
payment reminder leads to a small and statistically insignificant increase in compli-
ance relative to a baseline intervention consisting of only a payment reminder. 
However, this combined intervention did not significantly influence perceptions of 
peer compliance relative to the baseline intervention. At least in this experiment, 
it is plausible that information on peer compliance failed to affect own compliance 
because this information did not sufficiently alter perceptions of peer compliance.
One study that did find effects of providing information on peer behavior is 
Hallsworth, List, Metcalfe, and Vlaev (2014), who examine the effects of a variety of 
interventions on the timely payment of taxes in the United Kingdom. In addition 
6 Examining responses relative to priors is also important because of the possibility of perverse effects. If 
individuals realize that compliance is actually lower than they thought, they may reduce their own compli-
ance behavior. This possibility is particularly important in developing economies, where tax compliance 
is often low.
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to the “reciprocity” interventions discussed above, this study gave some participants 
one of the following three messages about compliance norms: 1) “9 out of 10 people 
pay their tax on time”; 2) “9 out of 10 people in the U.K. pay their tax on time”; or 
3) “9 out of 10 people in the U.K. pay their tax on time. You are currently in the 
very small minority of people who have not paid us yet.” They find significant effects 
on early payment from all three messages, with the largest effects from the final 
message. In a subsequent experiment, the authors test the “descriptive” norms from 
the first experiment (what other individuals are doing) against “injunctive” norms 
(what others believe should be done) and find that descriptive norms appear to be 
more powerful overall. It is possible that these interventions did change individual 
priors in this context; it may also be that this compliance margin (timely payment) 
is more sensitive to such treatments than the evasion decision.
Another way in which governments could leverage social forces is to facilitate 
social recognition for compliant taxpayers. Emerging evidence from field experi-
ments suggests that recognition can in fact encourage compliance, at least under 
some conditions. Dwenger et  al. (2014) include a treatment arm in which those 
paying at least the required amount of the German church tax have a probability 
of having their names published in a local newspaper if they wish to do so. This 
treatment reduces payments for those who had evaded the church tax in the past, 
indicating that social recognition can backfire for those who lack intrinsic moti-
vation to pay the church tax. In contrast, they find suggestive evidence that the 
treatment further increases payments among those who were already motivated to 
pay more than the required amount in the past.
These heterogeneous findings are perhaps not surprising: we would expect 
the effects of social norms and recognition to depend on how individuals update 
their priors about peer compliance and how they view the signaling value of compli-
ance. These factors may vary both across contexts and across types of taxpayers. 
Treatment effects may also cancel out in aggregate, if, for example, an intervention 
causes some taxpayers to positively update their views about compliance but causes 
others to update negatively. We view this body of evidence as indicative of a role 
for peer effects and social influences in tax compliance but much remains to be 
learned about the circumstances under which interventions targeting these motiva-
tions are effective in changing behavior.
Culture
Culture refers to broad social norms that persist over long periods of time 
and across generations. Such persistence is one of the primary characteristics that 
distinguishes “culture” from contemporaneous peer effects, though the two are 
obviously related. The parameters of the additional utility term for paying taxes, 
whether it is conditional on the state’s behavior or on the behaviors and views of 
other individuals, can be considered part of one’s culture if these parameters reflect 
(internalized) social norms that persist over long periods and across generations.
The obvious empirical challenge in discerning a causal effect of culture is to sepa-
rate the effects of culture from other aspects of the environment. Studies examining 
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the effect of culture on tax compliance have therefore attempted to examine the 
behavior of individuals from different cultural backgrounds when placed in a similar 
environment. One strand of literature has compared tax evasion in similar labora-
tory experiments across two or three countries (for example, Alm, Sanchez, and de 
Juan 1995; Cummings, Martinez-Vazquez, McKee, and Torgler 2009; Gërxhani and 
Schram 2006; Lefebvre, Pestieau, Riedl, and Villeval 2011). These studies generally 
find differences across countries in tax evasion despite similar subject pools and 
experimental protocols. However, given the limited number of countries in each 
of these studies (three at most), these studies cannot credibly relate country-level 
evasion to any measure of country-level tax morale. Hence, they measure culture as 
a “residual”—that is, attribute whatever gap cannot be explained by the observable 
factors in their study to the effect of culture or tax morale.
An alternative strategy to examine the effect of culture is to exploit variation 
arising from individuals who reside in the same country (and are therefore argu-
ably subject to the same current institutions and environment) but have varying 
countries of origin. Using survey-based measures of tax morale, Halla (2012) 
finds that American-born individuals in the United States have higher tax morale 
when their country of ancestry has higher average tax morale, controlling for 
individual demographics. Individuals in the United States with ancestors from a 
country with a 10-percentage point higher tax morale have about a 4-percentage 
point higher tax morale, where both tax-morale questions are measured as binary 
variables. Kountouris and Remoundou (2013) find similarly sized effects among 
first-generation immigrants in a large sample of European countries. A potential 
concern with these findings is that culture could simply affect the interpretation 
of or response to such survey questions. Thus, evidence on the role of culture is 
more credible when tax morale can be related to other outcome measures, ideally 
direct measures of tax evasion.7 The DeBacker, Heim, and Tran (2012) study of 
US corporations with owners from different countries, discussed above, is able to 
relate culture to actual compliance behavior in an analogous setting. Their finding 
that corruption in firm owners’ countries of origin affects evasion even in a common 
enforcement environment is a convincing demonstration that culture does influ-
ence real behavior.
Taken together, these results suggest that there are indeed cultural differences 
across countries, both in attitudes toward evasion and compliance behavior. This 
7 Because Halla (2012) has no measures of tax evasion of his General Social Survey respondents, he 
cannot directly relate culture to outcomes for respondents. However, he ingeniously uses a “reverse” 
strategy. He examines whether current evasion outcomes in the countries of ancestry can be explained 
by tax morale as measured by respondents in the United States from the corresponding countries of 
ancestry. As a proxy for evasion, he uses a widely used measure of underground production (also referred 
to as “shadow economy”). However, as we noted earlier in footnote 3, it is generally not valid to relate 
measures of the shadow economy that are constructed as combinations of predictors to measures of 
tax morale. The particular measure of the shadow economy that Halla borrows from the literature is 
constructed using tax morale data, so regressing it on tax morale can uncover a mechanical relationship.
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implies that we may see persistent differences in compliance across countries even 
if they have similar enforcement environments.
Information Imperfections and Deviations from Expected Utility
Information imperfections and decision-making biases are not always consid-
ered in the context of tax morale, but they clearly represent deviations from a fully 
rational model of tax compliance. Such factors could affect individuals making 
compliance decisions in several ways: taxpayers might misperceive parameters of the 
optimization problem (for example, the likelihood or consequences of an audit); 
fail to comply due to limited attention or costs of complexity; or be subject to system-
atic biases in their decision process (for example, loss aversion or overweighting of 
small probabilities).
Most tax authorities deliberately limit information on their auditing and 
enforcement procedures. It would therefore not be surprising for individuals to have 
incomplete information about true audit rates or penalties. Using matched IRS-survey 
data from the United States, Scholz and Pinney (1995) find that individuals report 
a subjective probability of getting caught (conditional on underreporting income) 
that is on average an order of magnitude higher than the probability that the IRS will 
actually audit an individual’s return. Further, they find that variation in actual audit 
probabilities across individuals is not predictive of the variation in subjective prob-
abilities of getting caught. However, these results come with a caveat: the subjective 
probabilities of getting caught were based on a hypothetical case where  the indi-
vidual underreports income, which were then compared to IRS audit probabilities 
that were based on all tax returns, not just those with underreported incomes. Natu-
rally, the objective IRS audit probabilities would likely have been higher if they had 
been based only on tax returns with underreported income.
In contrast, the Del Carpio (2014) study mentioned earlier finds that individ-
uals in Peru perceive tax enforcement to be weaker than it actually is, which implies 
that disclosure of true enforcement could enhance tax collection. Del  Carpio 
finds that a combination of a payment reminder and information about enforce-
ment of a local property tax both increases perceived enforcement and results in 
increased tax compliance. Interestingly, the effects appear to be largely driven by 
the payment reminder, which suggests a failure of individual optimization due to 
limited attention rather than through misperceptions of the probability of enforce-
ment efforts.8 This is consistent with Hallsworth, List, Metcalfe, and Vlaev (2014), 
which finds a direct effect of payment reminders on timely remittance of owed UK 
income taxes. A role for limited attention is also found by Dwenger et al. (2014). 
A “salience” treatment that shortens the standard German church tax mailing and 
increases the focus on the church tax payment obligation, schedules, and deadline 
8 Another possible interpretation is that the payment reminder itself increased enforcement perceptions 
and the specific enforcement information did not have an incremental effect. Del Carpio (2014) finds 
that the payment reminder on its own did not significantly increase perceived enforcement, although it 
is possible that the lack of significance reflects lack of power in measured perceptions.
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significantly decreases the fraction of people who evade the church tax. Together, 
these results suggest that tax payment may be subject to the same types of behav-
ioral biases we observe in many other contexts: individuals may simply forget to 
make payments or procrastinate in remitting owed taxes. In very low-enforcement 
environments, such behavior not only delays tax payments but may in fact reduce 
overall revenue collection if the tax authority lacks the capacity to follow up with 
nonpayers. Individuals may also have limited information about the rules of the 
tax code. Recent testimony to Congress from the US General Accountability Office 
(2011), for example, argued that complexity contributes to the “tax gap” between 
what tax is owed and what is paid. However, it is difficult to know the extent to which 
complexity leads to honest errors in reporting versus facilitates deliberate evasion.
Finally, people may in some cases deviate from the behavior predicted by 
expected utility theory in the Allingham and Sandmo (1972) model. A first indica-
tion of such deviation comes from Alm, McClelland, and Schulze (1992), who find 
in a laboratory setting that student subjects react remarkably strongly to a small audit 
probability and that their behavior cannot be rationally explained at any level of risk-
aversion. Of course, the notion that individuals may overweight small probabilities 
is predicted by prospect theory. More recently, two studies using large administra-
tive datasets find evidence that individuals are much more likely to seek tax shelters 
if they have a balance due than if they are to receive a tax refund. Rees-Jones (2014) 
finds a shift in the mass of the balance-due distribution in the United States away 
from positive amounts. This shift is particularly pronounced for taxpayers with 
greater access to tax shelters. The author demonstrates that such behavior could 
be driven by loss-averse individuals pursuing sheltering options more aggressively 
when they have a balance due and rules out other plausible explanations for the 
observed patterns. While tax sheltering need not imply illegality, it seems likely that 
at least some of the increased use of tax shelters stems from tax evasion. Engström, 
Nordblom, Ohlsson, and Persson (2013) pursue a related strategy using data from 
Sweden. They demonstrate that the balance due prior to adjustments affects the rate 
at which individuals claim deductions for “other expenses for earning employment 
income” in a manner predicted by a model of loss aversion. This type of deduction 
is a plausible proxy for tax evasion because it is notorious for high rates of claimed 
deductions that are rejected if audited (around 90 percent of audited deductions in 
this category are disallowed).
Policy Lessons
What policy lessons can we draw from the evidence on tax morale? The most 
obvious lesson is that the extent of tax evasion can be affected by policies beyond 
standard tax enforcement actions, such as detection probabilities and punishments. 
Clearly, an Allingham and Sandmo–type model does not fully capture individual 
motivations for tax compliance. This finding should not be surprising: channels 
such as intrinsic motivation, social norms, peer effects, and limits to rationality are 
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known to be important in a variety of other domains, including in the contexts of 
charitable giving and private provision of public goods, which are closely related to 
tax compliance.
The potential importance of tax morale in determining evasion suggests that 
policymakers may have access to a broader range of instruments to affect compli-
ance than implied by a standard enforcement model. Simple nudges to taxpayers, 
such as presenting information in a more accessible form or providing payment 
reminders, can reduce tax evasion (for example, Del Carpio 2014; Dwenger et al. 
2014; Hallsworth et al. 2014). In addition, some evidence suggests policies that might 
be helpful even though the effect of the policy itself has not yet been directly tested. 
For example, the evidence from Engström et al. (2013) and Rees-Jones (2014) on 
loss aversion indicates that tax compliance could potentially be improved through 
over-withholding—because those who are likely to receive refunds are less likely to 
be motivated by loss aversion to seek out tax shelters.
On the other hand, the direct evidence from field experiments attempting 
to manipulate intrinsic motivation, reciprocity, and social norms to improve tax 
compliance has been decidedly mixed. To the extent that such interventions have 
been successful in changing behavior, they often appear to act primarily on “small 
stakes” decisions like paying taxes on time or paying relatively small taxes and fees. 
There are several ways to interpret these findings.
First, it could be that these channels do exist but are small in magnitude rela-
tive to the factors in the standard model. As discussed, assessing relative magnitudes 
is very challenging. While many of the field experiments include an enforcement 
treatment, it is generally extremely difficult to compare the “strength” of the 
enforcement versus tax morale interventions or to know how they shift individuals’ 
beliefs relative to their priors. Note that it is also important to be cautious when 
comparing the costs and benefits of threats of enforcement and social notifications. 
Threat-of-audit letters (or more generally, letters that prime individuals to focus on 
enforcement) are often not backed up by actual increases in enforcement. While 
threatening enforcement is cheap, such threats must ultimately be backed up by 
greater and potentially quite costly enforcement in equilibrium. In contrast, social 
interventions may be relatively cheap in equilibrium.
Second, it could be that tax morale is important, but fairly inelastic. For 
example, in a model with honest taxpayers and strategic taxpayers, intrinsic motiva-
tion may have a large effect on overall compliance (for the honest taxpayers), but 
moral suasion interventions may not affect behavior for either group. Also, many 
tax morale channels may be inelastic to the types of interventions that are feasible 
for researchers to test experimentally. For example, designing field experiments 
to affect culture would be very difficult. Interventions may also not be powerful 
enough to overcome individual priors: a letter arguing that tax revenue is impor-
tant for funding public goods may not be effective if individuals have a strong (and 
perhaps accurate) belief that revenues are often expropriated or inefficiently spent. 
However, these arguments do not imply that tax morale cannot be affected by actual 
policies undertaken by governments: as the Besley, Jensen, and Persson (2014) 
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paper on the poll tax experience in the United Kingdom indicates, even temporary 
policies that affect tax morale can have lasting effects on compliance.
Finally, the evidence strongly indicates heterogeneous treatment effects in 
response to interventions intended to affect tax morale. The effects of these inter-
ventions appear to be influenced by both the context (for example, are existing 
levels of compliance high or low?) as well as characteristics of the individual 
taxpayer (for example, does the taxpayer appear to be intrinsically or extrinsi-
cally motivated?). Obviously, heterogeneity makes designing appropriate policy 
responses challenging: interventions targeting tax morale could be ineffective or 
potentially even have perverse effects in some environments or for some popu-
lation subgroups, and identifying the groups for which interventions are likely 
to be effective (for example, the intrinsically motivated) may be quite difficult 
in practice.
More broadly, what does it mean for tax policy if tax morale exists as a determi-
nant of compliance and can be affected by government decisions? Conditional on 
a given enforcement environment, there is at least the possibility for tax morale to 
improve compliance. However, we do not see the potential importance of tax morale 
as being limited solely to reducing the tax gap between what is owed and what is paid: 
the possibility of tax-morale-driven compliance has broader implications for optimal 
tax policy. For example, the structure of the tax schedule itself could influence 
compliance through a tax morale channel, as indicated in the poll tax study. While 
the switch to a poll tax is an extreme example, this study suggests that perceived 
fairness of the tax schedule can affect compliance. This finding may hold true more 
generally, even in cases in which isolating the causal effect of the tax schedule on 
compliance is challenging. Tax morale could also affect how behavior responds to 
taxation, depending on the specific channel of tax morale. If the channel is pure 
altruism, for example, then individuals receive a direct utility benefit from an addi-
tional tax payment, which at least partly offsets the utility loss of the consumption 
reduction due to the additional tax payment. Thus, pure altruism can reduce labor 
supply responses to taxes. Tax-morale-driven compliance could also reduce individ-
uals’ incentives to engage in costly behavior to avoid or evade taxes.
Directions for Future Research
Policymakers, practitioners, and researchers are developing a better under-
standing of the channels through which policies can leverage tax morale to improve 
compliance, but there is clearly still much to learn. Here, we emphasize some of the 
areas that could prove especially productive for research.
First, it would be useful to examine why similar interventions have produced 
varying results in different contexts. In many cases, it is difficult to determine 
whether the lack of effect of an intervention resulted because the intervention was 
too weak to affect tax morale or because there truly was no meaningful effect of this 
tax morale channel on compliance.
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Second, field studies of tax morale to date have been one-shot in nature. From 
an academic perspective, observing dynamic effects could help to provide direct 
evidence on specific channels of tax morale. From a policy perspective, the poten-
tial of ratchet effects alters the cost–benefit calculus of tax morale (and potentially 
enforcement) interventions. For example, increases in compliance could be rein-
forced if individuals feel that they are getting better public services or if they respond 
positively to peer compliance. Similarly, negative shocks to morale or to compliance 
could lead to a downward spiral in tax morale and compliance.
Third, some of the most important channels of tax morale may be inelastic 
to the types of interventions that are feasible in randomized trials, but elastic to 
actual policies undertaken by governments. We applaud the recent move towards 
field experiments conducted in collaboration with tax authorities around the world. 
However, researchers should also consider other approaches to investigate compo-
nents of tax morale, particularly those that cannot be easily manipulated in the field. 
Some examples discussed in this paper include taking advantage of natural experi-
ments, as in the Besley, Jensen, and Persson (2014) study of the United Kingdom 
poll tax, and other creative identification strategies, like the paper by DeBacker, 
Heim, and Tran (2012) that used variation in firm ownership to identify a culture 
channel for tax morale.
Finally, existing empirical studies of tax morale have generally not attempted to 
estimate the welfare effects of tax morale—which is unsurprising given that welfare 
analysis can be challenging in settings where utility maximization does not fully 
explain behavior or where the utility function depends on social effects. Moreover, 
the welfare effects likely depend on the exact channels through which tax morale 
operates; for example, do peer effects operate by giving people more warm-glow 
utility from paying taxes or do they operate through a social sanction on being 
caught evading? Despite the challenges of welfare analysis in the context of tax 
morale, we see this as an important area for further research.
■ We thank Timothy Taylor, David Autor, Chang-Tai Hsieh, and Ulrike Malmendier for 
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